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Wal-Mart,  the  largest  retailer  worldwide,  has  been  suspected  of  exercising 
market power over input providers, both merchandise suppliers and workers. 
However, in spite of a growing body of literature investigating the beneficial 
economic impact of the company through its price-lowering effect, research 
analyzing the company’s economic impact over input suppliers is limited. This 
paper presents a general framework which can be used to investigate Wal-
Mart’s  market  power  over  input  suppliers,  vis-à-vis  a  variation  in  input 
productivity,  focusing  on  homogenous  intermediate  goods  supplied  locally.  
The  model  is  general  enough  to  account  for  incumbents’  reaction  to  Wal-
Mart’s entry resulting in exit, entry and changes in the production technology. 
A simplified version of the theoretical model is tested using data on local labor 
markets. Preliminary results show Wal-Mart having a wage lowering effect 
due  mainly  to  the  increased  productivity  of  labor,  while  the  increase  in 
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Wal-Mart, Oligopsony Power and Entry: an Analysis of Local Labor Markets 
 
1. Introduction 
Wal-Mart,  the  largest  retailer  worldwide,  has  reshaped  the  American  economic 
environment  in  ways  that  go  beyond  triggering  structural  changes  in  the  retailing  industry 
(Basker, Klimek and Hoang Van 2008). One of the main concerns regarding the company’s 
expansion is that its beneficial impact on consumers through low prices (Basker 2005b; Basker 
and Noel forthcoming; Cleary and Lopez 2008; Hausman and Liebtag 2007), may be generated 
not only through the company’s efficient logistic system
1 but also via market power over input 
suppliers, these being both merchandise suppliers (Lynn 2006) and workers (Bonanno and Lopez 
2008).  
  Wal-Mart’s  alleged  market  power  over  suppliers  has  become  an  issue  attracting  the 
attention of both economists and opinion leaders. If, on the one hand, the company’s so-called 
“squeeze” of suppliers can be supported by several anecdotal cases (see Bianco 2007), on the 
other hand, the issue may be much more extensive.  Foyer (2007), for example, argues that 
suppliers who sell their goods to Wal-Mart may be forced out of business not directly because of 
the company’s requests for low prices, but also because other retailers do not accommodate 
suppliers’ requests of higher prices since they are competing with Wal-Mart themselves. Another 
indirect impact of Wal-Mart on input suppliers comes from the augmented competitive pressure 
that the company creates by increasing imports and outsourcing from less developed countries.
2 
                                                 
1 Financial Times has described Wal-Mart as “an operation whose efficiency is the envy of the world’s storekeepers 
(Edgecliffe–Johnson, 1999). Wal-Mart logistic management is destined to become even more efficient with wide 
use of the new Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology to manage in-store stocks (The Economist, 
6/16/2006). 
2 Basker and Hoang Van (2008) estimate that Wal-Mart’s growth along with the reduction in input cost, due to tariff 
reductions, account for 40% of the growth of US imports from China in the period 1998-2004.    3
Despite the relevance of understating the impact of the phenomenon, to date there is little 
formal analysis aiming to measure the extent of Wal-Mart’s impact on suppliers. Foyer (2007) 
points out that one of the main difficulty in undertaking such analysis is to find an appropriate 
definition of the relevant market, since Wal-Mart’s suppliers are spread across the U.S. and 
abroad. Two additional issues make this type of analysis even harder to be pursued successfully: 
1) the limited availability of extensive and accurate data on input markets, and 2) the lack of 
access to Wal-Mart data. 
This paper presents a framework that circumvents these limitations proposing a model to 
measure  Wal-Mart’s  shift  in  retail  oligopsony  power  over  suppliers  of  homogenous  goods 
produced locally. The rationale behind the model is that, by focusing on locally supplied inputs, 
one could measure the change in market conduct in geographically limited retail markets as Wal-
Mart’s store openings occur. Also, thanks to the assumption of homogeneity, only one market-
level price for each intermediate good is needed, which allows to overcome problems connected 
with data availability.  
The model accounts for three scenarios: 1) a (Wal-Mart) pre-entry scenario; 2) a post 
entry scenario where incumbent firms do not react to Wal-Mart’s entry and; 3) a second, more 
complete, post-entry scenario in which retailers’ entry, exit and changes in the technology used 
by incumbents are taken into account.
3    
As a preliminary first application of this model, the impact of Wal-Mart’s entry on retail 
wages is analyzed. Using a simplified version of the theoretical model and county-level data 
results suggest that 1) Wal-Mart’s depressive effect over per-capita retail earnings does exist, and 
                                                 
3 As Khanna and Tice (2000) pointed out that two of the strategies that retailers implemented as a consequence of 
Wal-Mart entry were to divest some of their less efficient establishments or to invest in new technology. Both these 
factors, along with entry from large retailer may push efficiency up.    4
2) that the main source of this effect is the increased productivity of labor, while the increase in 
oligopsony power accounts for only 15%.  
 
2. A General Model of Oligopsony with Entry 
The  model  draws  from  Azzam’s  (1997)  oligopsony  model,  Lopez,  Azzam  and  Lirón-
España (2002) oligopoly model and its extension in Cleary and Lopez (2008)
4. Differently from 
those analyses, this paper derives explicitly the sources of variation in the equilibrium price of 
the input consistently with the entry of a large firm (i.e. Wal-Mart) and it allows for changes in 
the  incumbents’  composition  as  a  consequence  of  the  company’s  entry,  as  well  as  for  the 
adoption of technologies that resemble that of Wal-Mart.  
 
2.1 A general model of oligopsony  
Consider a local retail market where Wal-Mart does not operates. Assume there are N 
retailers, each using a vector of K homogeneous inputs to deliver a bundle of goods sold at 
competitive prices. Assume the kth input is supplied locally, meaning that the structure (and 
conduct) of the retail firms located in a given area will have an impact on the market price for the 
input. The supply of k is defined as:  
(1)    ( ) , k k k X f w = Z  
where wk is input k’s market price and Zk is a vector of supply shifters.  Consider retailer i, where 
{ } 1,..., i N = maximizes profits by choosing the optimal amount of inputs: 
                                                 
4 To date, only two studies have adopted a structural approach to investigate Wal-Mart’s conduct, Cleary and Lopz 
(2008) and Bonanno and Lopez (2008). In particular, Cleary and Lopez (2008) have used a simple structural model 
in part similar to that discussed in this paper, where Wal-Mart entry is considered as an exogenous shock that shifts 
traditional retailers’ conduct in the Dallas Forth-Worth milk market.   5
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where ( ) i R × is retailer i revenue function, xi is a vector of inputs used by i, t is a time indicator 
and  p is a vector of competitive prices common to all retailers. Assume that, for simplicity, 
retailers do not have market power over inputs other than the k-th; this assumption allows ease of 
exposition and could be easily released. Assuming that the revenue function is continuous and 
differentiable in inputs’ quantity one has the following optimal condition for the k-th input:
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h = is the semi-elasticity of input supply 











=∑   it  the  i-th  retailer’s  conjectural  variation  in  the  k-th  input,  and 
( ) , . i i k R x ¶ ¶ represents the marginal revenue product of k .  
Assuming for smplicity that the N retailers adopt the same technology; the production 
function for the bundle of goods sold by retailer i is assumed to be continuous, homogenous and 
twice differentiable in the inputs, and takes a quadratic functional form:  
(4)    ( )




K K K K
i i k ik kl ik il kt ik
k k l k
Y t x x x x t a a a
= = = =
= + + ∑ ∑∑ ∑ x .         
  To maintain the exposition simple, the special case of only two inputs, namely Xk and Xl 
will be considered, where k is the input over which retailers show market power, l that for which 
the market is assumed to be competitive.  Following Lopez, Azzam and Lirón-España (2002), 
                                                 
5 The market price for any of the other imports will be defined by the following condition 
( ) , , , /
k i i i k w R t p x
- - = ¶ ¶ x indicating that the price of an intermediate good will be equal to its marginal revenue 
product.    6
differentiating (4) with respect to  , i k x  replacing this expression into (3), multiplying both sides of 
(3) by   , i k k x X , standardizing output prices to 1,  and summing across N one has:  
(5)    ( ) 1
;
k
k k kk k k kt kl l kl
H
w H X t X G a a a a
h
+ Q
















=∑  is the Generalized Herfindahl index proposed by Shi, Chavas and Stiegert (2008) 
to measure cross-market effects of imperfect competition on  bundle pricing; Xk  (Xl ) represent 









Q = ∑  is the industry-level 
(weighted) equilibrium conjectural variation.
 6 
Manipulating  (5),  one  can  obtain  the  oligopsony  version  of  Blair  and  Harris  (1993) 
Buying Power Index (BPI), or 







= = - ; 
where MRPk is the marginal revenue product of input k. The BPI measures the markdown, or 
rather the percentage of input price, below the competitive level which retailers would pay to 
suppliers. The BPI grows in magnitude as the demand for inputs becomes more concentrated and 
as the input supply becomes more semi-elastic.  
 
                                                 
6 The reader should notice that  ( ) 1 1 k k H H - £ Q £ - . The limit values represent respectively the perfectly 
competitive scenario ( ) 1, i i q = - " and the monopoly scenario
1
, , , i i k j k
i j




= "  
  ∑ . An other value of interest 
is  0 Q = ( ) 0, i i q = " , leading to a “0” conjecture Cournot oligopoly game outcome.    7
2.2 Wal-Mart’s entry 
Consider a local market where Wal-Mart enters. This scenario treats the number and 
composition  of  the  incumbent  retailers  as  fixed  after  Wal-Mart’s  entry;  in  other  words,  this 
scenario accounts for the short-run “shock” that occurs in the input market immediately after 
Wal-Mart’s entry.
7 
Let  the  post-entry  analogous  of  the  firm-level  equilibrium  condition  (3)  for  the  N   
retailers other than Wal-Mart be: 
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Wal-Mart optimizing behavior is:  
(7 - b)    ( ) ( ) ,
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= .  
Wal-Mart’s technology is assumed to be represented by the same functional form as that 
of other retailers; however, its parameterization cannot be the same, as the company is likely to 
have  a  “superior”  technology  in  terms  of  both  input  utilization,  and  logistic  structure 
(Edgecliffe–Johnson 1999). The marginal product of input k for both all retailers other than Wal-
Mart, and for Wal-Mart, respectively, are:   
                                                 
7 As this assumption would imply that Wal-Mart’s entry does not push competitors out of business or that it does not 
attract  other  retailers  in  the  same  geographic  areas  it  is  clearly  very  strong  and  not  consistent  with  anecdotal 
evidence and empirical findings (Khanna and Tice 2000). 
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Multiplying both sides of (8-a) and (8-b) by the input shares, summing across the N+1 
retailers and manipulating, one obtains the following market-level expression (see Appendix 1 
for the steps leading to equation (9)) : 
( ) ( ) ( )
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i
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=
= + ∑   are  the  post-entry  updates  of 
(respectively) the Herfindahl and the Generalized Herfindahl indexes and the terms shifting the 
aggregated  marginal  revenue  products  are  , , ( , ) 1 ( 1) k wm k k wm k k f s s b b = + - , 
' 1 2
, , ( , ) 1 ( 1) kk wm k kk k wm k kk f s H s b b
- = + - , 
' 1
, , , , ( , , ) 1 ( 1) kl wm l wm k kl kl wm l wm k kl f s s G s s b b
- = + -   and 
, , ( , ) 1 ( 1) kt wm k kt wm k kt f s s b b = + - .  
In order to find a post-entry counterpart of equation (5), one needs to obtain an aggregate, 
market level expression of the industry conduct. Multiplying the second to last terms of the RHS 
of (7-a) and (7-b) for each retailers’ input share and summing across retailers one has:  
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∑    9
Assuming that post-entry input shares for each of the i-firms is proportional to the pre-
entry ones by a factor equal to 
1/2 d , so that  
(11)    
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= =
= + = + = + ∑ ∑ ;  
which leads to the market-level conduct expression (whose derivation is reported in Appendix 
2):  
(12)     ( ) ( ) ( )
'2 2 ' '
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N
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Q = - + -  
  ∑ ∑   represents  the  shift  in 
oligopsonistic conduct with the entry of Wal-Mart. 
Combining (12) and (9), normalizing for prices, one obtains the market-level input-price 
setting equation with an entrant: 
( ) ( )
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from which it is easy to observe that the post-entry BPI is: 




w w h h
Q + Q
= - - ; 
where the second term on the RHS represents the shift in oligopsony power as consequence of 
Wal-Mart’s entry.  
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2.3 Post-entry scenario with entry, exit and productivity shifts  
The third scenario considers that, as consequence of Wal-Mart’s entry, some incumbent 
retailers will be driven out of business (exit the market), while others enter the market.  The 
number of firms in the market at an arbitrary period t subsequent to that of Wal-Mart’s entry is 
defined as  
t N ;   
'
t N  represents the number of firms operating in the market at time t which were 
active before Wal-Mart entered, so that    
'
t t N N -  indicates the number of entrants after Wal-Mart 
entry occurred (new entrants).   
Once again, the short-run profit maximizing conditions (where inputs’ quantity is the 
choice variable), for the   
t N retail firms, and Wal-Mart, respectively, are  
(15-a) 
  ( )
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= +∑ ɶ . 
In proceeding with the aggregation of (15-a) and (15-b), one should multiply, again, both 
sides of each equation for the respective market shares  , i k s ɶ  for the retail firms other than Wal-  11
Mart and  , wm k s ɶ , for Wal-Mart.  In proceeding, consider first that some of the   
t N  may have 
adapted their technology to resemble that of Wal-Mart.  This outcome can be the result of the co-
existence of three phenomena: 1) inefficient retailers exited the market; 2) more efficient firms 
have entered the market and 3) some of the existing retailers have adapted their technology to 
resemble that of Wal-Mart. Suppose that one can partition   
t N in two groups   
t Ni and   
t Ne the first 
one indicating the number of firms that have not adopted a technology similar to Wal-Mart and 
the second that that of those firms adopting such technology.  Formally:  
(16)       ( )  
   
, , ,
, , , ,
for  1,..., ,
for  1,...,
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which leads to the following expressions: 
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Summing (17-a), (17-b) and (17-c) one obtains the market level measure of the marginal 
productivity of the k-th input as in equation (9) which, after some manipulation (see Appendix 
3), gives:   12
( ) ( ) ( )
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where the  (.)(.) f s are described in section 2.2, and the other marginal revenue product shifters 
(again, output prices are assumed to be standardized to 1) are:  
(18-a)    , , , , ( , , ) ( 1) k wm k wm k k wm k wm k k g s s l b l b = - ;  
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k H ɶ and kl G ɶ are the updated Herfindahl and Generalized Herfindahl Indexes:  
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.  , [ 1,..., ) i k l = - +¥  indicates the variation 
in  input  share  of  firm  i  since  the  period  when  Wal-Mart  entered  or 
'
, , (1 ) i k i i k s s l = + ɶ   and 
, , (1 ) wm k wm wm k s s l = + ɶ .  , 1 i k l = -  indicates a retail firm that has exited the market after Wal-Mart’s 
entry;  , 1 0 i k l - < <  indicates one that has lost part of its input share while  , 0 i k l > indicates one 
which has increased it.
8   
  In this third scenario the market–level measure of retailers conduct is (see Appendix 4 for 
its derivation):  
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- - Q = + - ɶ . Equation (20) shows that market conduct 
is no longer only function of Wal-Mart’s presence (as in equation 12) but it is also function of 
the changes that have occurred since its entry,    '
, , ( , ) i k i k s l Q as well as of the company’s growth 
 
, , ( , ) wm wm k wm k s l Q . 
                                                 
8  Equations  (19-a)  and  (19-b)  are  obtained  by  noting  that 
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  The resulting the market-level input-price setting equation is:  
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 which results in the following expression of the BPI:  
(22)   
  ( )           '
, , , , , ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 k k k k wm wm wm k i k i k wm k wm k
k
k k k k
H s H s H s H
BPI
w w w w
l l
h h h h
Q Q Q +Q
= - - - - ,  
stating that the post-entry markdown with full adjustments is function of: 1) the shift in baseline 
conduct as consequence of the company entry, 
'
, ( ) wm wm k s Q ; 2) the variations in other retailers’ 
composition,   
, , ( , ) i k i k s l Q ; and 3) growth of Wal-Mart’s presence   
, , ( , ) wm wm k wm k s l Q . 
   Also, it is easy to note that equation (21) nests equation (13), which in turn nests equation 
(5). Similarly equation (22) nests (14) which nests (6), fact which will result to be useful in the 
empirical implementation of the model.  
   
3.  An application to local labor markets.  
The model illustrated in the previous section is used to determine the sources and the 
extent  of  Wal-Mart’s  depressive  effect  on  retail  workers’  wages.  Since  retail  labor  is  rather 
homogenous, mainly unskilled and it is also supplied locally  (as unskilled labor has limited 
mobility), the retail labor markets represent a good case study to test the validity of the model. 
Also  the  widespread  presumption  that  Wal-Mart  lowers  retail  wages  has  triggered  a  debate   15
concerning the company’s effect on the condition of workers in the retailing industry, fact which 
makes the analysis interesting on its own merit. 
Besides  being  the  largest  retailer  in  the  World,  Wal-Mart  is  also  the  largest  private 
employer with a workforce of 1.36 million people, (Wal-Mart Inc. United States Operational 
Datasheet, May 2007) exceeding public education employment (Neumark, Zhang and Ciccarella, 
2008).  Wal-Mart has often been accused of paying low wages and shifting health care costs onto 
local and state governments. Shils and Taylor (1997), report that half of Wal-Mart “associates” 
in the 1990’s received wages only slightly above the prevailing Federal minimum wage of $4.25 
an hour and that many of the company’s full time employees were food stamps recipients.
9  
The impact of Wal-Mart on workers, highlighted by anti-Wal-Mart movements and the 
company’s crackdown against unionization,
10 is an increasing concern of local policymakers, 
who have already tried to pass regulations to target “big-box” retailers, Wal-Mart in particular, to 
improve the conditions of their workers by obliging the company to pay both higher wages and 
hourly benefits (e.g., Chicago’s ‘living wage’ ordinance)
11 or to contribute to public healthcare 
expenditures (The Maryland Fair Share Health Act).
12  
                                                 
9 The company does provide its workers with other types of compensations: since 1971 Wal-Mart offers its own 
stocks to its associates based upon the profit growth of the company (Walton and Huey, 1992). 
10 Wal-Mart is notoriously a “union free” environment, which has caused the major unions of retail workers to 
sponsor anti-Wal-Mart movements: for example Wal-Mart Watch is an organization that allegedly “monitors” Wal-
Mart business practices founded by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). WakeUpWalMart.com 
follows the same broad objectives as Wal-Mart Watch and is strongly connected with the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW). 
11 On July 26, 2006 the Chicago City Council passed an ordinance requiring stores with more than 90,000 square 
feet and companies grossing more than $1 billion annually to pay a minimum wage of $10 by 2010 along with 
hourly benefits worth at least $3. The ordinance was to affect only “big-box” retailers, slowing down the penetration 
of Wal-Mart in the Chicago area, and would have included not only Wal-Mart but also Kmart, Toys R’ Us and 
Target which were already operating in the area. 
12 In January 2006 the Maryland State Assembly passed the Maryland Fair Share Health Act (SB 790) which would 
have required employers with more than 10,000 employees to spend 8% of their payroll on medical benefits or pay 
the difference in taxes that would have gone to the Maryland Medicaid fund. At the time of the bill Wal-Mart 
employed nearly 17,000 individuals in the state and was the only known company of such size that did not meet that 
spending requirement (Wagner, 2006).   16
Academics have also shown increasing interest in investigating the impact of Wal-Mart 
on retail workers. The existing empirical literature investigating these effects has mainly treated 
Wal-Mart’s  presence  as  a  shock  to  local  labor  markets  (e.g.  Basker,  2005a;  Hicks,  2005; 
Neumark et al., 2008; and Dube, Lester and Eidlin, 2007). A common feature of these studies is 
that the labor market is not modeled explicitly, raising doubts as to the economic interpretation 
of their findings; for instance, a negative effect of the company on wages and/or employment 
could be attributed either to market power over workers or to an increase in the productivity of 
non-labor inputs. 
These analyses have produced so far mixed evidence of positive and negative effects due 
primarily to differences in the empirical strategy used to correct for the endogeneity of Wal-
Mart’s location decision and the data used. Regarding the effect of Wal-Mart on employment 
alone, Basker (2005a) finds that although Wal-Mart has a small positive effect on county-level 
retail employment, it reduces wholesale employment but does not affect sectors outside the scope 
of the company’s goods and services. She used planned openings instead of actual openings to 
correct for store location endogeneity and did not measure the impact on wages. Hicks (2005), 
using quarterly workforce indicators data, found similar positive effects for the company’s entry 
on  Pennsylvania  counties’  employment  and  labor  turnover  without,  however,  addressing  the 
problem of endogenous store location. 
Regarding the effects of Wal-Mart on earnings, Neumark et al. (2008) found a negative 
impact of the company on both county-level retail employment and earnings; they estimated that 
for each store opened, retail employment fell by 3.2 % and retail earnings dropped by about 
2.7%.  These  authors  used  interactions  of  time  and  distance  from  Wal-Mart  headquarter  in   17
Benton County, Arkansas, to correct for the endogeneity of Wal-Mart’s store location.
13 Similar 
instruments for Wal-Mart’s location are used by Dube, Lester and Eidim (2007) who found that 
Wal-Mart expansion causes a reduction in retail workers’ earnings estimated to be between 0.5 
and 0.9%. They also established that Wal-Mart’s effect in decreasing wages it is not due to 
differences in workforce characteristics, but it is primarily associated with increased rents for the 
company.  
A first attempt to measure the anticompetitive behavior of Wal-Mart over retail workers 
is that of Bonanno and Lopez (2008) who modeled Wal-Mart as a dominant firm with wage 
setting power. Although their work is limited in scope, focusing on area where the company 
operates  and  disregarding  its  location  decision,  their  results  found  Wal-Mart  does  having 
monopsony power over workers, with varying magnitude across the country, with the maximum 
degree of market power estimated for rural areas in southern central states, exceeding 6%. 
 
4. Empirical Model 
The empirical model illustrated below is a restricted version of the conceptual one and 
draws from the empirical work of Cleary and Lopez (2008) and Bonanno and Lopez (2008). As 
the data used in its implementation are at the county level, the “local” area of interest will be a 
county.  The  key  estimable  equation  of  the  empirical  model  does  not  account  for  exit/entry 
adjustment but it provides an exemplification of equation (13), where the number of Wal-Mart 
stores in a given area (county) at time t,  it WM , is used as a proxy of Wal-Mart input share and its 
functions:  
                                                 
13 Although distance and time are truly exogenous variables and the motivation behind the use of them as 
instruments of Wal-Mart presence comes directly form the description of the company’s expansion strategy by the 
same Wal-Mart founder’ Sam Walton in his autobiography (Walton and Huey, 1992) their identification strategy is 
heavily criticized by Basker (2006) in a technical working paper.   18
(23)   
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 ;
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
w H H WM K H X WM
K WM H X WM t
l l l l l l
l l l m
= + + + + +
+ + + +
     
where Xit indicates retail workers in county i at time t, wit their wage, Kit is a measure of capital, 
it H is  the  index  of  industrial  concentration  in  the  labor  market’  t  is  a  time  trend,  the s l are 
parameters to be estimated, and  it m  is an error term.   
This specification is incomplete (and therefore will generate preliminary, and perhaps 
unreliable, results), as not all terms that are part of the marginal revenue product of labor are 
interacted with the number of Wal-Mart and no measure of the Generalized Herfindahl Index is 
included.  However,  there  is  a  one-to-one  correspondence  of  the  parameters  in  (23)  and  the 
structural parameters in (13) which can be recovered from the estimates.  
The model as in (23) is incomplete since an equation for the supply of labor is needed to 
identify key parameters such as the semi-elasticity of supply. For simplicity, the supply of retail 
labor is assumed to be semi-logarithmic and expressed as: 
(24)    0 ln ; it it WM it j it it
j
X w WM Z e d h d d = + + + + ∑          
where the Zits are supply of labor shifters, the  s d are parameters to be estimated and eit is an error 
term.    
Another issue that needs to be addressed empirically is the endogeneity of Wal-Mart 
location. The approach used follows Neumark et al., (2008), Dube et al. (2007)
14 and Cleary and 
                                                 
14 The logic behind the use of the distance from Wal-Mart headquarter in Benton County as instrument of the 
company’s presence comes from the fact that the company bases its growth strategy on expanding in areas closer to 
preexisting distribution centers, following the “hub and scope” logistic system.  The distance from Benton County as 
good predictor of  Wal-Mart’s relevance in a county comes from the words of  Wal-Mart founder  Sam Walton 
autobiography:  “We figured we had to build our stores so that our distribution centers, or warehouses, could take 
care of them, but also so those stores could be controlled. We wanted them within reach of our district managers, 
and of ourselves here in Bentonville, so we could get out there and look after them. Each store had to be within a 
day’s drive of a distribution center. So we would go as far as we could from a warehouse and put in a store. Then we 
would fill in the map of that territory, state by state, county seat by county seat, until we had saturated that market 
area” (Walton and Huey, 1992, pp. 110-111).    19
Lopez (2008). An instrument for the number of Wal-Mart  to be used in the estimation of (23) 
and (24) is obtained exploiting the geographic expansion pattern of the company. The number of 
Wal-Mart stores will be regressed on a set of exogenous variable as follows:  
(25)    
2
0 1 2 3 * * ;
WM
it i i it h it it
h
WM distBC distBC t distBC Z g g g g g e = + + + + + ∑  
where distBCi represents county i’s distance from Wal-Mart’s headquarters in Benton County, 
Arkansas and 
WM
it Z is a vector of exogenous variables. Predicted values will be used in place of 
actual ones as part of the RHS variables in (23) and (24). 
 
5. Data and Estimation 
The data used to estimate equations (23), (24) and (25) are county-level observations 
encompassing all counties in the contiguous U.S. for a seven-year period (1994-2000). The main 
data sources are publicly available data from the U.S. Bureau of Census and Emek Basker’s 
Wal-Mart  store  openings  database.
15  The  latter  contains  detailed  information  on  Wal-Mart’s 
store locations and opening dates, which are used to obtain county-level number of Wal-Mart 
stores.  In order to assess the impact of Wal-Mart entry on retail wages, only counties where the 
company did not operate before 1994 are retained. Due to Census’ data disclosure restrictions 
and missing observations, the sample was reduced to include only 1,449 counties for a total of 
10,143 observations.  
Data on county-level retail employment (NAISC 44) were retrieved from the County 
Business Patterns (CBP) database of the U.S. Bureau of Census.  These data include: number of 
industry  employees,  number  of  establishments,  total  earnings  (in  thousand  of  dollars)  and 
                                                 
15 The author is grateful to professor Emek Basker at the University of Missouri for not having put any restrictions on 
the scholarly use of the database reported in her website:  http://economics.missouri.edu/~baskere/   20
number of establishments belonging to nine employment size classes.
16 Earnings per worker, 
obtained by dividing total earnings by the number of employees, are used in place of wages.  The 
shifters used in the supply of labor equation are total labor force, unemployment rate (following 
Hall, Henry and Pemberton, 1992) and the percentage of the county population belonging to 
three age groups: between 15 and 24, 25 and 64 and over 65 years of age (to control for the 
composition of the retailing supply of labor).
17 In order to control for unobservables, the shifters 
include also state-level fixed effects.   
In equation (23), the number of retail establishment per squared mile is used as proxy for 
capital investment.  County-level measures of the Herfindahl index for retail labor are not readily 
available; a proxy is constructed using the following formula:  
2
( , ) ( )
( , ) 100
2
c c c c
c c
c i
Nclass i j j i






   
where c indicated the number of classes, ic and jc  indicate lower and upper range for each one of 
the c classes,  ( , ) c c Nclass i j  is the number of establishments belonging to each class and X is the 
county-level retail labor.  
The  exogenous  variables  other  than  the  distance  from  Benton  County  used  to 
instrumentalize the number of Wal-Mart stores are: population density  (given that Wal-Mart 
locates  preferentially  in  areas  not  densely  populated;  see  Bonanno  2008),  and  state-specific 
dummies. Distance from Benton County (measured in hundreds of miles) is obtained applying 
the Haversine formula to county coordinates obtained from the Census Gazetteer of counties for 
the  year  2000.  As  industrial  concentration  is  also  potentially  endogenous,  the  proxy  of  the 
                                                 
16 The County Business Pattern groups establishment in nine classes according to their number of emp0-loyees: 1-4; 
5-9; 10-19; 20-49; 50-99; 100-249; 250-499; 500-999; and 1,000 or more employees. 
17 County labor force data including total labor force and unemployment rate are retrieved from the U.S. Bureau of 
Census CPS, while county-level population characteristics are retrieved from the Population Estimates Program.   21
Herfindahl  index  is  instrumentalized  following  Lopez,  Azzam  and  Lirón-España  (2002)  by 
regressing it on a set of exogenous variables such as the (distance) weighted average of the 
lagged number of retail stores operating in a 100 miles radius from county i, an indicator variable 
for rural counties (from and the County Typology Codes reported by the Economic Research 
Service  of  the  United  States  Department  of  Agriculture)
18,  and  state  dummies.  Once  all  the 
variables  are  operational  and  the  instrument  for  the  number  of  Wal-Mart  stores  available, 
equations (23), (24), and the Herfindahl Index instrument are estimated via Three-Stage Least 
Squares (3SLS).    
 
7. Preliminary Results 
The estimated parameters for equations (23) and (24) are reported in Table 1. The results 
for the OLS used to instrumentalize the number of Wal-Mart stores and the Herfindahl index 
equation are omitted for brevity.  The estimated coefficients of the supply of retail labor show 
that  the  semi-elasticity  of  retail  labor  supply  is  positive  and  significant,  for  an  estimated 
parameter of 0.1655, resulting, at the sample averages, in an elasticity of 2.3219. The results 
support  Neumark  et  al  (2008)  findings  that  as  Wal-Mart  expands,  retail  labor  is  impacted 
negatively: the supply of labor shrinks in fact of approximately 0.6% for each store opened. The 
behavior of the shifters is consistent with that of previous research (Bonanno and Lopez 2008): 
the retail supply of labor grows with the size of the labor force, but it is not impacted by the rate 
of unemployment; also individuals in the age group including high school/college students (15-
24) are more likely to actively seek job in retailing, being also more willing to accept part time 
                                                 
18 The distinction between rural and urban counties considers as “urban” those counties indicated as “metro” by the 
Bureau of Census and “rural” the remaining ones. Metro areas include central counties with urbanized areas of 
50,000 or more residents, regardless of total area population. In addition, the Census “metro” classification includes 
outlying counties with commuting thresholds of 25 percent, with no metropolitan character requirement.   22
jobs and the flexibility required by retailing operations; individuals in the age group going from 
25 to 64 are less likely to participate in the retailing supply of labor, while retirees (over 65 years 
old) appear indifferent.  
The estimates of the wage equation show the coefficient for the Herfindahl index being 
positive,  which  suggests  that  retailers  other  than  Wal-Mart  show  limited  anti-competitive 
behavior.  As  Wal-Mart’s  presence  increases,  the  market  becomes  more  anti-competitive 
(estimated coefficient for the interaction of the Herfindahl index with the number of Wal-Mart is 
negative and significant being -2.5418). This suggests that Wal-Mart’s presence shift retailers 
oligopsonistics’ conduct with respect to workers toward less competitive values. Also, it appears 
that labor utilization becomes more efficient over time. Structural parameters are presented in 
Table 2.   
The estimated conduct parameters, as well as the BPIs and the impact of Wal-Mart’s 
presence on wages (at the sample averages) are reported in Table 3. The value of the estimated 
baseline conduct parameter is 0.2080, which is statistically different than zero only at the 10% 
level. This provides evidence that retailers other than Wal-Mart have limited market power. The 
presence  of  Wal-Mart  causes  a  consistent  increase  in  oligopsony  power,  with  the  average 
industry conduct parameter doubling and reaching 0.4208.  The BPI increases in magnitude with 
Wal-Mart’s presence, going from a minimum of -0.13 % to a maximum of -0.59 % for each 
store, which is consistent with the wage differential across counties with and without Wal-Mart 
found by Dube et al. (2008) and in line with Bonanno and Lopez (2008) estimates of Wal-Mart’s 
monopsony power in counties having only one Wal-Mart store.    
At the sample averages, the estimated depressive effect of Wal-Mart on per capita retail 
earnings through market power is approximately $ 444, which is only about 15% of the total   23
estimated  depressive  effect  accounting  also  for  the  increasing  productivity  of  labor  as  an 
outcome of Wal-Mart’s presence, being approximately $ 3,000.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks  
Wal-Mart, the largest retailer worldwide, has been accused of being able to charge those 
low prices which have catalyzed its success, not only through an efficient logistic system, but 
also through the exertion of market power over input suppliers, both  merchandise suppliers and 
workers.  Despite the company’s reach grows larger and with it the amount of control over its 
suppliers, empirical research aimed at analyzing the anticompetitive behavior of Wal-Mart is 
limited, mainly because of the difficulties in underpinning the relevant market of analysis and the 
paucity of detailed data.  
The model developed in this paper overcomes these issues proposing a framework apt to 
investigate  the  anti-competitive  behavior  of  the  company  over  its  suppliers,  by  focusing  on 
homogenous inputs supplied locally. The model is as such that the company’s entry has the 
potential to shift retailers’ oligopsony power as well as the productivity of inputs. The model is 
flexible as it allows for entry, exit and retailers’ adoption of technologies to match that of Wal-
Mart, nesting simpler, more restrictive, scenarios.  A preliminary empirical use of the model to 
local retail labor markets, show that up to 85% of any decrease in retail per capita earnings due 
to  Wal-Mart’s  presence,  comes  from  a  decrease  in  the  marginal  revenue  product  of  labor, 
indicating only a small contribution of market power.  
    24
 
Table 1. Estimated Parameters and related statistics  
  Coefficients   St. Error  T-ratios   
Supply of Retail Labor       
W  0.1655  0.0214  7.7390   
NWM  -0.5894  0.1229  -4.7970   
Unemployment  -0.0101  0.0069  -1.4640   
Labor Force   6.02E-06  1.89E-07  31.8500   
% 15-24  0.0196  0.0039  4.9930   
% 25-64  -0.0162  0.0036  -4.4540   
Over 65  -2.49E-05  3.28E-05  -0.7595   
Constant   5.3156  0.3114  17.0700   
Fixed Effect          
       
Wage Equation        
H  4.7846  0.2771  17.2600   
H*WM  -2.5418  0.4002  -6.3520   
H*X  -1.73E-05  5.56E-06  -3.1190   
Capital  0.0246  0.0025  9.7840   
NWM  2.5774  0.1128  22.8500   
H*X*WM  1.79E-05  5.69E-06  3.1480   
Capital*WM  0.0217  0.0042  5.1530   
T  0.8378  0.0254  33.0200   
Constant  9.4825  0.1104  85.8800   
         
Supply Elasticity   2.3219  0.3000  59.8997   
         
System R
2  0.7283     
Supply of Retail Labor R
2  0.5503     
Wage Equation R
2  0.4499     
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Table 2. Structural Parameters   
0 k a l =   9.4825 
3 kl a l =   0.0246 
4 kk a l =   -1.7E-05 
5 0 1 / k b l l = +   1.271806 
6 3 1 / kl b l l = +   1.882114 
7 4 1 / kk b l l = +   -0.03468 
'
5 0 k a l l = +   12.0599 
'
6 3 kl a l l = +   0.0463 
'




Table 3. Measures of Wal-Mart’s Impact on Wages 
  Coefficients   St. Error  Wald-Stat*   
Conduct Parameters        
Q   0.2080  0.1116  3.4707   
WM Q   0.4208  0.0857  24.1119   
Impact of Wal-Mart on Wages       
Market Power  -0.4442  0.0699  40.3428   
Efficiency  -2.6162  0.1124  541.9336   
Total   -3.0604  0.1644  346.4878     
         
* For the Wald test the critical values of a
2
(1) c are 3.84, 6.63 and 10.83  
respectively for a 5%, 1% and 0.1 % significance level.   26
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Appendix 1 – Derivation of equation (9) 
Multiplying both sides of (8 –a) and (8 – b) by the input market shares and summing 
across all N+1 firms one has  
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rearranging, adding and subtracting appropriate quantities one obtains  
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Appendix 2 – Derivation of equation (12)  
Another way to express equation (10) is  
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Substituting (11) into (12) one has  
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Rearranging and using the fact that, by definition 
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Appendix 3 – Derivation of equation (18)  
  Summing (17-a), (17-b) and (17-c), one has 
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which, adding and subtracting appropriate quantities for each group of variables, and using the 
expressions for 
k H and   
kl G , one obtains.  
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ng  equation  (19-a)  and  (19-b);  the  equalities 
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Appendix 4 – Derivation of equation (20)  
Consider 
(A-11)  
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  The first term on the numerator inside the bracket can be rewritten as   
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Manipulating (A-13) and using, again the fact that   '
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Which reorganizing gives:  
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, gives equation (20).  